Section I. Introduction
Fiscal federalism in the United States has a distinctive structure that contrasts sharply with that in most other industrialized nations. Indeed, foreign scholars, visiting in the United States, are often astonished at what they find: a highly decentralized structure consisting of fifty different fiscal and governmental systems with many apparent anomalies when compared to fiscal systems elsewhere. Our purpose in this paper is to describe and explore the U.S. "brand" of fiscal federalism and to contrast it with the more typical forms of intergovernmental structure that one finds elsewhere.
We begin in section II with an overview of the distinctive features of the intergovernmental system in the United States. We then proceed in subsequent sections to investigate in greater depth the striking variety in fiscal structures and the operation of systems of public education across the fifty states. Our treatment has two basic themes. The first is simply the highly decentralized nature of the public sector in the U.S.; the second is the large variation in governmental and fiscal structure and in laws across the fifty states. In the final section of the paper, we turn to the normative implications of our descriptive analysis and ask whether or not all this diversity across the states is a good thing. Does such diversity produce outcomes that increase social welfare? Section II. An overview of the distinctive character of the U.S. fiscal system Compared to most other industrialized nations, the U.S. has a relatively small and highly decentralized public sector. In Table 1 , we display for a subset of the countries comprising the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the size of the government sector as measured by total revenues or total expenditures as a share of Gross Domestic Product.
In 2009, the U.S. ranked 32 out of 34 OECD countries in the size of its government sector as measured by revenues. In that year, U.S. governments financed much of their spending through borrowing, thus, when the size of government is measured by expenditures, the U.S. rank rises to 24, which still places the country in the bottom one-third of the 34 OECD countries.
Using two different sources of data (the OECD and the International Monetary Fund, IMF), we display in Table 2 for several countries the shares of total revenues and of total expenditures that are attributable to sub-national governments. The U.S. is one of the more decentralized countries among this set of industrialized countries. Depending on the measure and the source, the degree of decentralization in the U.S. sits in a tight range from 43 percent to 47 percent, and expenditures are only slightly more decentralized than are revenues, with that difference being the smallest of all of the differences displayed. Only Switzerland and Canada are more decentralized than the U.S.
1 In several countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, for example), expenditures are much more decentralized than are revenues. In these countries, revenues from the central government are an important source of funding for subnational units of government. (Congressional Budget Office, 2013) . About half of these transfers support public-health programs, most notably the Medicaid program, which provides health care for low-income households. There are also transfers to the states to assist with various infrastructure programs such as highway construction.
But there are no general transfers to the states. It is interesting in this regard that Robin Boadway (2006) , in his general treatment of federal fiscal systems, argues that "Equalizing transfers are the lifeblood of federations. They facilitate the decentralization of fiscal
1 Spain also appears to have a large degree of decentralization; however, as explained in the footnotes to Table 2 , we doubt the accuracy of the data for Spain. 2 In an earlier literature, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that there is a causal relation between the extent of fiscal decentralization and the overall size of the public budget. They contend that competition among lower-level governments constrains the monopolistic tendencies of the public sector so that countries with highly decentralized public sectors would tend to have relatively small public sectors. This notion became known as the Leviathan Hypothesis. The evidence is, however, mixed at best. Oates (1985) , in the first empirical study of "Leviathan," finds that the evidence runs counter to the Brennan-Buchanan proposition. Some later empirical work, however, suggests a more complex relationship. See, for example, Ashworth, Galli, and Padovano (2013) .
responsibilities by addressing the inequities and inefficiencies that would result from decentralization of spending and revenue-raising responsibilities" (p. 376). This is not the case in the U.S., where there are no general equalizing transfers.
To see how distinctive the U.S. grant system is, in Table 3 and Figure 1 , using IMF data, A current and highly controversial matter that reflects this diversity is the issue of singlesex marriage. Several states have passed laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman, while other states make provision for single-sex marriages. This has become even more complicated by the unwillingness of some states to recognize single-sex marriages legally performed in other states. These issues are currently being sorted out through the judicial system.
The reliance on diverse approaches to current policy issues also manifests itself in some new and recent efforts to address global climate change. Rather than imposing a uniform set of standards for reducing carbon emissions from power plants, the Obama Administration has promulgated a new regulation that offers the states a menu of policy options to meet their respective pollution-reduction targets (Davenport and Baker, 2014) .
In the next two sections, we explore more deeply and systematically the extent of decentralization and the variation across the states for two major institutions: state and local fiscal systems and the structure and funding of public education. We then address the normative issue of whether or not the striking diversity across states enhances overall social welfare.
Section III. Fifty distinct fiscal systems
Diversity is one of the characteristics that best summarizes the 50 fiscal federal structures of the states in the United States. In this section we document to what extent diversity is present in variables important to understanding the sub-national public sector. with a mean value of almost 30 percent, but with large differences; for example, local governments in Arkansas raise less than ten percent from the property tax, while local governments in Connecticut raise close to 60 percent. We conclude that there are large differences across the states in their tax structures for both the primary tax sources at the state government level and the most important local government tax, the property tax.
States are less diverse in how they spend their revenues. The largest expenditure category, at 21.76 percent of total spending, is K-12 education, where the variability (coefficient of variation) is small relative to the variability in the other two spending shares reported (for higher education and public welfare) and the smallest variability in the We conclude that the state and local fiscal systems of the 50 states differ significantly and that the differences in their tax structures are much larger than the differences in their expenditure structures. States spend similar shares of total spending on education, for example, but obtain resources to finance expenditures through quite different tax structures. In the next section, we describe in some detail differences in systems of funding K-12 education in the U.S.
Section IV. K-12 Education: Equity versus local control
Over the last half century, there has been a movement among the states to reform the method of financing K-12 education. Oftentimes the reforms were inspired by state Supreme
Court cases focused on inequities in funding across school districts. Policies enacted to reduce inequities tended to reduce local control and local reliance on the property tax for funding education. In general, dispersion in spending was reduced via increased resources for lowspending school districts.
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Different states have taken different approaches. …yet to come… Section V. Has diversity been stable and is all this diversity a good thing?
In the preceding sections of the paper, we have presented a basically descriptive treatment of the fiscal systems of the 50 states in the United States with two themes: first, the public sector in the U.S. is relatively decentralized and, second, the diversity in systems, especially in tax structures, is quite large and striking. This raises two related questions. The first is an important normative issue: Is this diversity desirable? In other words, does it produce outcomes that increase overall social welfare? The second is whether diversity prevails over time and meets the tests of political stability and economic success.
The traditional economic case for fiscal decentralization is, in fact, based on the improved allocation of resources in the public sector that results from expanded fiscal choice at lower levels of government. It argues that diversity across the state-local sector, if appropriately structured, improves the performance of the overall public sector. In short, diversity is potentially a good thing.
This view has been formalized in the so-called Decentralization Theorem, which lays out a set of sufficient conditions for fiscal decentralization to be welfare-enhancing.
The Decentralization Theorem: For a public good-the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central government or for the respective local government-it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments to provide Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions (Oates, 1972, p. 35 ).
This proposition seems quite obvious, but it does call attention to two conditions that are needed for its validity: the absence of any significant economies of scale associated with the centralized provision of the public good, and the absence of any important spillover effects across jurisdictions. On the first issue, existing studies suggest that decentralized provision of most public services (aside most notably from national defense) do not exhibit economies of scale that would justify centralized provision. The public outputs provided by state and local governments appear in most cases to exhaust any major scale economies.
The issue of interjurisdictional spillover effects is more complex. For many state-local outputs involving infrastructure (e.g., local roads and parks), the benefits and costs accrue predominately within the jurisdictional boundaries. But there are some cases where state and local activities affect their neighbors. For environmental regulation, for example, polluting activities in one area may reach across boundaries; the emissions from power plants in one locality or state are sometimes carried by prevailing winds into neighboring jurisdictions. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has used this as justification for the centralized regulation of such emissions.
A yet more complicated issue is education. In the highly mobile modern world with households moving among jurisdictions, the quality of public education in one state or locality can have significant implications for the productivity of workers and the quality of life elsewhere. Moreover, education also raises equity issues. As Boadway (2006) has pointed out, there may exist in a federation some sense of "horizontal equity," that households in certain jurisdictions should not suffer adverse effects by virtue of simply being located in a state or locality with high levels of fiscal needs and/or relatively low fiscal capacity. Intergovernmental grants can provide a fiscal instrument to address some of these perceived inequities. 4 To some extent, of course, the case for fiscal decentralization and diversity runs counter to such equity principles. But particularly as regards education, there may be a pervasive sense, both on efficiency and equity grounds, that certain standards of achievement in educational systems be met in all jurisdictions.
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In the U.S., this concern has manifested itself in the so-called "Common Core Initiative."
The governors of the fifty states responded to this issue by establishing a working group that in 2008-2009 drew up a set of standards for achievement across the states. These standards consist of a set of quantified benchmarks in English-language arts and mathematics at each grade level from kindergarten through high school. These are basic skills in reading and mathematics that are to be taught and whose achievements are to be measured by testing. The Initiative does not lay out any specific curriculum; this is left to the individual states. In addition, each state determines its own timelines and budgetary procedures for meeting the standards.
The recent experience with the Common Core Initiative in the U.S. provides some intriguing insights into the kinds of tensions that arise under such measures that seek uniformity across the U.S. states. As of mid-2014, 43 states had approved the Common Core standards, but considerable opposition had emerged. The governors of a few states introduced bills to repeal the standards and replace them with a new set of locally determined standards amidst charges that such standards amount to a central takeover of public schools. Thus, we find here a striking confrontation between various efficiency and equity concerns on a national scale and the strong sense of the importance of decentralized choice and diversity in the U.S.
In view of the tensions mentioned above, it is conceivable that diversity across states may diminish over time. These tensions combined with the forces of globalization and competition could very well be moving the system toward greater homogeneity. In fact, in Europe, while there is a move toward greater devolution in some countries, the European Union is building supranational institutions for governance and economic management, and harmonization is at the center of the political discussion. If we find that diversity in the U.S. has been stable over time, it would bring interesting lessons to the European discussion, and might support the notion that diversity is viable and associated with economic benefits and political stability.
To investigate whether diversity in fiscal systems in the U.S. has been stable over time,
we focus on the variables displayed in Table 5 and analyze their dynamics by examining their means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variation over the years 1977-2011. For most variables there is no clear pattern of convergence or divergence over time in the value of the coefficient of variation and therefore we conclude that diversity in the 50 fiscal systems is stable.
The state individual income tax and general sales tax variables, which displayed the largest divergence in values in 2011 (see Table 5 ), have displayed similar degrees of variance for the period analyzed, although with some fluctuations up and down over the period. The local property tax, on the other hand, displays a slight decrease in its mean, and some reduction also in its coefficient of variation, showing therefore some reduction in diversity across states. This is likely due to the wave of reforms that began in the late 1970s and continued to roll across the states for many years, bringing in greater uniformity.
The degree of decentralization shows stability over time in all three statistics. The size of state government has experienced an increase in its mean, but there is no significant change in the diversity measures. Similar patterns can be observed for the size of local government. The expenditure share variables, which exhibited lower diversity values than the tax figures in 2011,
show quite stable patterns except for public welfare. An important increase in the mean of the share of public welfare over time corresponds with a decreasing mean of the share of K-12 education, but while the latter maintains its diversity over time, the share of public welfare shows a clear decrease in diversity across states. This increase in uniformity is likely due to the increasing importance of Medicaid as a share of the public welfare budget and the direct role of the federal government in financing the program and setting the rules.
An interesting picture emerges from this examination of the 50 fiscal systems in the U.S.
over the last 35 years. Of the variables characterizing the state and local fiscal systems, the variables that are the most diverse and have remained diverse over time are those that arguably matter less for equity and perhaps matter the most for efficiency -the major tax variables. The states have chosen more uniformity in expenditure variables, in particular, education and public welfare, which are more relevant for achieving equity. In effect, the decentralized system in the U.S. appears to have achieved a measure of equality or solidarity while allowing local choice over taxes. There is no simple answer to the normative question we pose in this section of the paper:
does diversity in subnational fiscal systems increase overall social welfare? There has been some prior exploration of the potential magnitude of the welfare gains from diversity-and this work suggests that the gains may be quite substantial (Oates, 1997). The evidence presented here suggests that diversity has thrived in the U.S., particularly with respect to tax systems, despite many potentially derailing forces. It appears, at least for the U.S., that a decentralized, diverse system has served the country well. Reliance by s&l governments on federal grants
